Message-ID: <GAORPTd0114.txt@us.govnews.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination (Letter Report, 11/30/2000, GAO/GAO-01-14). Eight federal agencies now have teams that can respond to a terrorist attack involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. Each team varies in size, structure, geographical scope, and task. The teams do not duplicate one another. They have unique capabilities and functions, and many have experience dealing with different types of agents and weapons. Because of the teams' various functions, the type of terrorist incident would determine which team would be most appropriate to respond. GAO found that federal agencies lack a coherent framework to develop and evaluate budget requirements for their response teams because there is no national strategy with clearly defined outcomes. To improve interagency cooperation, federal agencies have participated in several group activities. For example, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Interagency Steering Group, led by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, is identifying federal response teams that could respond to different terrorist scenarios. Federal, state, and local agencies have also participated in major field exercises that simulated urban terrorist acts. These efforts could go a long way toward improving the operational coordination of federal response teams. --------------------------- Indexing Terms ----------------------------- REPORTNUM: GAO-01-14 TITLE: Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination DATE: 11/30/2000 SUBJECT: National defense operations Nuclear warfare Biological warfare Terrorism Chemical warfare Financial management Budgeting Interagency relations Radiological warfare Emergency preparedness IDENTIFIER: Department of Energy: Radiological Assistance Program FEMA Federal Response Plan National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan Department of Justice: Five Year Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan CDC National Pharmaceutical Stockpile Program Department of Justice/FEMA: TOPOFF 2000 ****************************************************************** ** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a ** ** GAO Testimony. ** ** ** ** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although ** ** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but ** ** may not resemble those in the printed version. ** ** ** ** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when ** ** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed ** ** document's contents. ** ** ** ****************************************************************** GAO-01-14 Report to Congressional Requesters November 2000 COMBATING TERRORISM Federal Response Teams Provide Varied Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination GAO- 01- 14 Letter 3 Appendixes Appendix I: Compendium of Selected Federal Response Plans and Authorities 34 Appendix II: Selected Information About Federal Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Consequence Management Response Teams 37 Appendix III: Selected Functions of Federal Consequence Management Response Teams in a Chemical Terrorist Incident 43 Appendix IV: Selected Functions of Federal Consequence Management Response Teams in a Biological Terrorist Incident 48 Appendix V: Selected Functions of Federal Consequence Management Response Teams in a Radiological/ Nuclear Terrorist Incident 53 Appendix VI: Organizations and Locations Visited 60 Appendix VII: Comments From the Department of Defense 62 Appendix VIII: Comments From the Department of Energy 63 Appendix IX: Comments From the Department of Justice 64 Appendix X: Comments From the Department of Health and Human Services 66 Appendix XI: Comments From the Department of Veterans Affairs 67 Appendix XII: Comments From the Federal Emergency Management Agency 68 Appendix XIII: Comments From the Environmental Protection Agency 69 Appendix XIV: Comments From the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 70 Appendix XV: Comments From the Office of Management and Budget 71 Appendix XVI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 74 Related GAO Products 75 Tables Table 1: Primary Functions Performed by Federal Consequence Management Response Teams in a Chemical Terrorist Incident 43 Table 2: Primary Functions Performed by Federal Consequence Management Response Teams in a Biological Terrorist Incident 48 Table 3: Primary Functions Performed by Federal Consequence Management Response Teams in a Radiological/ Nuclear Terrorist Incident 54 Figures Figure 1: Federal and Local Responders Participate in a Joint Training Exercise in New York City 7 Figure 2: Federal Consequence Management Response Teams 9 Figure 3: Aerial Measuring System Aircraft With Detection Equipment 14 Figure 4: Arrival of a Simulated National Pharmaceutical Stockpile During the TOPOFF 2000 Exercise 25 Abbreviations DOD Department of Defense FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency OMB Office of Management and Budget PPD Presidential Decision Directive Lett er November 30, 2000 The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking Democratic Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives The Honorable Christopher Shays Chairman Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations Committee on Government Reform House of Representatives A terrorist act involving a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear agent or weapon presents an array of complex issues to state and local responders. The responders, who may include firefighters, emergency medical service personnel, and hazardous materials technicians, must identify the agent used to rapidly decontaminate victims and apply appropriate medical treatments. They must determine whether the agent has spread beyond the incident site and what actions should be taken to protect other people. They must also be concerned about damage to the physical infrastructure and about coordinating efforts with law enforcement personnel as they conduct their investigation. If the incident overwhelms the capabilities of state and local responders, they may turn to the federal government for assistance. Federal agencies may provide assistance by deploying various response teams. In response to your request, we reviewed federal agency teams that can respond to and help manage the consequences of a domestic terrorist incident involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear agents or weapons. This report discusses (1) the characteristics of federal response teams, (2) whether duplication among teams belonging to different agencies exists, (3) the budget requirements process for teams and how the budgets are linked to a national strategy, and (4) initiatives to improve the operational coordination of federal response teams across agency lines. In our review, we defined response teams as groups of personnel and equipment that could deploy to or near an incident site to provide assistance. We focused on teams that assist with consequence management in a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear incident. Consequence management includes efforts to provide medical treatment and emergency services, evacuate people from dangerous areas, and restore government services. To identify the capabilities and characteristics of federal response teams, we reviewed our prior reports, conducted interviews with agency officials, and met with the teams at various locations nationwide. We also observed a national- level combating terrorism exercise, which allowed us to see the capabilities of several response teams in mock terrorist incidents. We also attended several conferences that addressed response teams and terrorism issues. Results in Brief Eight agencies have 24 types of teams that can respond to a terrorist incident involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear agents or weapons to assist state and local governments. 1 The characteristics of these teams vary. Specifically, teams vary in their size, composition of personnel, equipment, geographical coverage, transportation needs, and response time. Moreover, most federal teams are long- standing and have purposes other than combating terrorism, such as responding to natural disasters, hazardous material spills, and military crises. For example, Department of Defense teams can provide a wide variety of consequence management capabilities in response to a domestic terrorist incident. However, these teams have a primary military role and mission. Even in the absence of a terrorist threat, federal agencies would still need most of their response teams to carry out other missions. Federal response teams do not duplicate one another. Each team has a unique combination of capabilities and functions when it is deployed to a terrorist incident. Moreover, several federal teams have expertise concerning certain types of agents and weapons that could be used in an attack. For example, Department of Energy teams specialize in responding to incidents involving radiological agents or weapons. Because of the differences in the capabilities and expertise of the teams, the type of incident would determine which individual team would be most appropriate to respond. Federal agencies lack a coherent framework to develop and evaluate budget requirements for their response teams. We have noted previously that the federal government lacks a national strategy to guide resource 1 The eight agencies are the Departments of Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Transportation, and Veterans Affairs; the Federal Emergency Management Agency; the Environmental Protection Agency; and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. investments for combating terrorism. The Attorney General's interagency plan on counterterrorism and technology crime, in our view, is the current document that most closely resembles a national strategy. However, the plan does not establish or define clearly desired outcomes that the federal government is trying to achieve. Because most federal response teams have multiple missions, federal agencies do not track the resources for their teams based on their roles in combating terrorism. In 1999, the National Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget began a new interagency process for evaluating federal agencies' programs for combating terrorism. The results of this evaluation provided a basis for new combating terrorism budget requests in the President's Budget for fiscal year 2001. This effort gives decisionmakers in the administration and Congress a better picture of the resources federal agencies are devoting to their response capabilities. However, it does not serve as an effective mechanism for allocating funding to the highest priority areas because these areas have not been clearly defined. Two recent interagency activities could improve the operational coordination among federal response teams. First, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Interagency Steering Group, led by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, is identifying the federal consequence management teams that could be called upon to respond to different terrorist scenarios. Prior to this group's efforts, federal agencies did not engage in this type of planning for a terrorist incident. However, the steering group has not consulted with scientific experts or the intelligence community to assess the realism of the scenarios. According to a Federal Emergency Management Agency official, the scenarios were intended to be worst- case events that would stress the federal response system, and therefore assessing their realism was not a concern. As a result, it is uncertain whether the scenarios can provide a sound analytical basis for developing appropriate federal consequence management responses. Second, response teams continue to participate in various combating terrorism interagency exercises that provide agencies an opportunity to improve the operational coordination of their teams. In May 2000, the federal government sponsored a congressionally mandated national- level combating terrorism field exercise that tested the response and coordination of teams from federal, state, and local government agencies. The exercise represented considerable progress from past interagency exercises because it coordinated consequence as well as crisis management teams in a no- notice realistic field setting. However, no additional exercises of this nature are currently planned. We are recommending that the Attorney General modify the interagency plan on counterterrorism and technology crime to cite desired outcomes that could be used to develop and evaluate budget requirements for agencies and their respective response teams. Additionally, we are recommending that the Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency, take steps to require that the Weapons of Mass Destruction Interagency Steering Group develop realistic scenarios involving chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents and weapons with experts in the scientific and intelligence communities. Lastly, we are recommending that the Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency, sponsor periodic national- level consequence management field exercises involving federal, state, and local governments. The Departments of Defense, Energy, Justice, Health and Human Services, Transportation, and Veterans Affairs; the Federal Emergency Management Agency; the Environmental Protection Agency; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; and the Office of Management and Budget provided comments on a draft of this report. Their comments are presented and evaluated at the end of this letter following our recommendations. Background In a domestic terrorist incident, states and local affected governments have the primary responsibility for consequence management. The federal government can help state and local authorities if they lack the capability to respond adequately. Figure 1 shows a federal response team supporting a local government in a training exercise. Figure 1: Federal and Local Responders Participate in a Joint Training Exercise in New York City Source: U. S. Marine Corps Chemical- Biological Incident Response Force. Shortly after the April 1995 bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, the President issued Presidential Decision Directive 39, which enumerated responsibilities for federal agencies in combating terrorism, including domestic incidents. In May 1998, the President issued Presidential Decision Directive 62 that further articulated responsibilities for specific agencies. Both directives call for robust, tailored, and rapidly deployable interagency teams to conduct well- coordinated and highly integrated operations. If a national emergency has been declared, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is responsible for managing the consequence management support provided by other federal agencies and coordinating response activities with state and local authorities. Federal agencies provide this support through their response teams or other assets. FEMA coordinates the federal response through a generic disaster contingency plan known as the Federal Response Plan. The plan, organized around 12 emergency support functions, is used to respond to incidents or situations requiring federal emergency disaster assistance and to facilitate the delivery of that assistance. 2 In 1997, FEMA issued a terrorism incident annex to the Federal Response Plan to implement Presidential Decision Directive 39. The annex was revised in April 1999. Other federal authorities and contingency plans, such as the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan and the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan, may be activated in lieu of, prior to, or in conjunction with the Federal Response Plan. Appendix I summarizes selected federal plans and authorities that may apply for consequence management response to a domestic terrorist incident. Proposed spending to combat terrorism, as requested in the President's fiscal year 2001 budget, is about $11.3 billion. The $11.3 billion is divided into two broad categories: combating terrorism ($ 9. 3 billion, which includes $1. 6 billion directly related to weapons of mass destruction) and critical infrastructure protection ($ 2 billion). The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) tracks federal funding to combat terrorism and provides this information to Congress in an annual report. Numerous Response Eight federal agencies have response teams that can deploy to or near the Teams Can Provide site of a terrorist incident involving a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear agent or weapon (see fig. 2). The capabilities and characteristics of Assistance federal response teams vary in a number of ways. 2 The 12 emergency support functions are transportation, communications, public works and engineering, firefighting, information and planning, mass care, resource support, health and medical services, urban search and rescue, hazardous materials, food, and energy. Figure 2: Federal Consequence Management Response Teams Department Department of of Defense Defense Joint Joint Task Task Force Force for for Civil Civil Support Support U. U. S. S. Marine Marine Corps Corps Chemical Chemical - - Biological Biological Incident Incident Response Response Force Force Chemical/ Chemical/ Biological Biological Rapid Rapid Response Response Team Team U. U. S. S. Army Army Radiological Radiological Advisory Advisory Medical Medical Team Team U. U. S. S. Army Army Technical Technical Escort Escort Unit Unit U. U. S. S. Army Army Special Special Medical Medical Augmentation Augmentation Response Response Team Team - - Nuclear/ Nuclear/ Biological/ Biological/ Chemical Chemical Department of Health and Human Services U. U. S. S. Army Army Special Special Medical Medical Augmentation Augmentation Department Department of of Energy Energy Department of Health and Human Services Response Team - Aero- Medical Isolation Radiological Radiological Assistance Assistance Program Program Teams Teams Disaster Disaster Medical Medical Assistance Assistance Teams Teams Response Team - Aero- Medical Isolation Aerial Measuring System Disaster Disaster Mortuary Mortuary Operational Operational Response Response Teams Teams Aerial Measuring System National Medical Response Teams Federal Federal Radiological Radiological Monitoring Monitoring and and National Medical Response Teams Assessment Assessment Center Center National National Pharmaceutical Pharmaceutical Stockpile Stockpile Radiation Emergency Assistance Management Management Support Support Teams Teams Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/ Center/ Training Training Site Site Chemical, Biological, Environmental Protection Agency Radiological, and Environmental Protection Agency Department Department of of Transportation Transportation On- On- Scene Scene Coordinators Coordinators U. U. S. S. Coast Coast Guard Guard National National Strike Strike Teams Teams Nuclear Terrorist Environmental Environmental Response Response Team Team U. U. S. S. Coast Coast Guard Guard On- On- Scene Scene Coordinators Coordinators Incidents Radiological Radiological Emergency Emergency Response Response Team Team Department Department of of Veterans Veterans Affairs Affairs Federal Federal Emergency Emergency Management Management Agency Agency Medical Medical Emergency Emergency Radiological Radiological Emergency Emergency Response Response Team Team Response Response Team Team Nuclear Nuclear Regulatory Regulatory Commission Commission Regional Regional Incident Incident Response Response Teams Teams Source: GAO's analysis. Appendix II provides information on the mission, cited authority, size, location, transportation mode, and expected response times for the 24 types of federal teams discussed in this report. Teams Vary in Size, Teams vary in size, with some teams having fewer than 10 personnel and Composition, and others having almost 400 members. For example, a Department of Energy Equipment Radiological Assistance Program team has 7 members, a Department of Health and Human Services National Medical Response Team has 36 members, and the U. S. Marine Corps Chemical- Biological Incident Response Force has 373 personnel. Large teams such as the Department of Energy- led Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center, which may have several hundred members detailed from numerous federal agencies for a major incident, may send out a relatively small advance team and then tailor the follow- on team based on the requirements of the specific incident. Teams may be comprised of federal civilian employees, military personnel, contractor personnel, or federalized local personnel. 3 The U. S. Coast Guard's National Strike Teams and many Department of Defense (DOD) teams are comprised of military personnel. The Department of Veterans Affairs' Medical Emergency Radiological Response Team is comprised of federal civilian employees. Contractor personnel augment the Environmental Protection Agency's and the Department of Energy's teams. Medical response teams from the Department of Health and Human Services consist of medical personnel living in local communities who become federalized when the teams are activated and deployed to an incident. Team members may be dedicated full- time or may serve on a team as a collateral duty. DOD's teams such as the Joint Task Force for Civil Support and the U. S. Army Technical Escort Unit have dedicated full- time personnel, even when the teams are not deployed. The Department of Energy's teams, on the other hand, rely heavily on volunteers who have other jobs within the agency. Some teams, such as the Department of Veterans Affairs' Medical Emergency Radiological Response Team, are inactive until they are activated for training, exercises, or an actual incident. Moreover, some teams have members who assemble from disparate locations nationwide. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency's Radiological Emergency Response Team may draw staff from the agency's radiation laboratories in Las Vegas, Nevada, and Montgomery, Alabama. Teams have various amounts of equipment to perform their mission. The Department of Energy- led Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center brings an extensive array of communications and computer equipment as well as logistics support items such as generators. The U. S. Marine Corps Chemical- Biological Incident Response Force may 3 Federalized local personnel are not full- time, permanent federal employees but do become temporary federal employees and serve under government orders when their team is activated. For example, under the authority of the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, P. L. 93- 288, 42 U. S. C. 243, as amended, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services may federalize personnel. deploy with communications equipment, medical equipment and supplies, forklifts, generators, decontamination equipment, water purification equipment, and other supplies. In contrast, FEMA's Emergency Response Team, which coordinates response activities, arrives with cellular phones, pagers, and laptop computers. Teams' Geographic Many teams are geared toward response in a specific geographic region, Coverage and whereas others are intended for nationwide response. The Environmental Transportation Needs Differ Protection Agency's On- Scene Coordinators are located in each of the agency's 10 geographic regions and are responsible for response functions within their region. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's four Regional Incident Response Teams are also oriented toward a regional response. The Department of Energy- led Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center, the U. S. Marine Corps Chemical- Biological Incident Response Force, and the Department of Veterans Affairs' Medical Emergency Radiological Response Team are examples of teams that are intended for nationwide response. Expected response time varies by team, as does the mode of transportation. The Environmental Protection Agency's Radiological Emergency Response Team prefers to deploy its mobile laboratories by ground transportation and is expected to arrive within 2 to 3 days after notification. The Department of Health and Human Services' Disaster Medical Assistance Teams use commercial or military aircraft or ground transportation and are expected to arrive on site within 12 to 24 hours. Traveling by either air or ground transportation, a Department of Energy Radiological Assistance Program Team is expected to arrive within 2 to 6 hours of being notified. The U. S. Marine Corps Chemical- Biological Incident Response Force can deploy by ground transportation or on large military aircraft that can easily accommodate the large quantity and weight of equipment belonging to the team. An initial group can be ready to deploy in 6 hours, and the remainder of the team is expected to be ready to deploy within 24 hours. Most Teams Are LongStanding Most federal response teams are long- standing and were created for and Have Other purposes other than combating terrorism such as responding to natural Missions disasters, hazardous material spills, and military crises. Even in the absence of the threat of terrorism, the federal government would still need most of these response teams. The Department of Health and Human Services' Disaster Medical Assistance Teams were created under the National Disaster Medical System in the early 1980s to provide emergency medical care to victims of earthquakes, hurricanes, and other disasters. Since 1989, the Disaster Medical Assistance Teams have been activated on more than 19 occasions. Several examples include Hurricane Hugo in 1989, the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, and numerous floods in 1997 and 1998. The U. S. Coast Guard's and the Environmental Protection Agency's teams were created originally to respond to incidents where pollutants or contaminants have been released and pose a threat to public health or the environment. The U. S. Coast Guard created its three National Strike Teams under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 to respond to oil spills in waterways. The Environmental Protection Agency created its Environmental Response Team in 1978 under the Clean Water Act to provide scientific and technical expertise in response to the release of hazardous chemicals into the air, land, and water. Under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 4 these teams were given the authority to respond to hazardous materials incidents, which include deliberate acts of releasing hazardous materials. The U. S. Coast Guard has the lead for incidents in the coastal zone, including major waterways, and the Environmental Protection Agency takes the leading role when incidents occur in the inland zone. 5 DOD, compared to the other federal agencies, has the greatest breadth and depth of capabilities in its collective response teams. DOD and its response teams have capabilities relevant to all 12 of the emergency support functions in the Federal Response Plan. Nevertheless, the teams generally have missions in responding to military crises and may not be available to assist in a domestic terrorist incident involving chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents or weapons. For example, the U. S. Marine Corps Chemical- Biological Incident Response Force would support deployed U. S. military forces when facing the threat of attack from chemical or biological weapons. The U. S. Army Technical Escort Unit renders items safe such as a device, packages the items, and escorts and transports the items. In 1991 during Operation Desert Storm, the unit packaged and escorted captured samples of potential chemical and biological weapons for examination. The U. S. Army Radiological Advisory 4 This plan is described in appendix I. 5 These jurisdictional responsibilities are specifically defined in regional and area contingency plans. Medical Team provides guidance on the potential health hazards from radiological contamination and radiation exposure. However, this Army team also has a military mission of responding to a radiological accident and may not be available to respond to a terrorist incident. Agency Laboratories A few agencies have fixed assets such as laboratories that may augment Augment Response by teams and the overall federal response in a chemical or biological terrorist Federal Teams incident. In some incidents, these laboratories may perform functions that enable deployed federal response teams to perform their role. For example, when a diagnosis is confirmed by one of the laboratories at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention or the U. S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, the National Medical Response Teams and the Disaster Medical Assistance Teams can begin to treat victims appropriately. The laboratories at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention can rapidly analyze and test samples of chemical and biological agents. The U. S. Army's laboratory serves as a reference center for identification of biological agents and its primary mission is to protect military personnel against biological attack or endemic infectious diseases. According to officials at both agencies, their laboratories may be called upon to corroborate a diagnosis of an unusual biological agent. Federal Teams Do Not Federal response teams do not duplicate one another for a number of Duplicate Each Other reasons. Each team has a unique combination of capabilities and functions when deployed to or near the site of a terrorist incident. No single team or agency has all the capabilities and functions that might be required to respond to a terrorist incident. Some federal response teams have capabilities and functions that are clearly unique, such as the ability of the Department of Health and Human Services' Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams to process, prepare, and dispose of contaminated fatalities. Several federal teams would be more likely to respond to certain types of incidents because they have expertise concerning the type of agent used in the attacks. For example, Department of Energy teams specialize in responding to incidents involving radiological agents or weapons. Other teams have similar capabilities and functions, but there are also distinctions among these teams that differentiate them. One distinction is that they perform a wide variety of functions. In general, these functions fall into one of three categories- performing hands- on response functions, providing technical advice to federal, state, and local authorities, or coordinating the response efforts and activities of other federal teams. Because of the differences in the capabilities and expertise of the teams, the type of incident would determine which individual teams would be most appropriate to deploy. Hands- On Functions Hands- on functions include detecting and evaluating the agent used in the incident; dismantling, transferring, disposing of, and/ or decontaminating property; extracting and/ or decontaminating victims; performing triage on victims; and providing medical treatment. Some teams perform hands- on functions that are unique from any other federal team. For example, the Department of Health and Human Services' Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams are the only federal teams whose primary function is to recover, identify, and process fatalities. These teams can respond to any type of chemical, biological, or radiological/ nuclear incident. The Department of Energy's Aerial Measuring System is the only team that can fly aircraft over an incident site to rapidly survey large areas for radiological contamination (see fig. 3). Figure 3: Aerial Measuring System Aircraft With Detection Equipment Source: Department of Energy. This team gathers information that is used by other responders and decisionmakers to conduct an initial response until further assessments are made. Unlike any other federal teams, the Department of Energy's Radiological Assistance Program teams can respond quickly to a radiological incident, put on protective gear, enter a contaminated area, and take initial measurements of radioactivity. Another federal team with unique capabilities in a radiological incident is the Environmental Protection Agency's Radiological Emergency Response Team. This team, through its two mobile laboratories, can prepare air, soil, and water samples and perform a field analysis on them to detect low levels of radioactivity. According to Environmental Protection Agency officials, these capabilities are unique among federal response teams. Several teams perform hands- on medical functions. While some of their capabilities and functions are similar, some are different. For example, while the Department of Veterans Affairs' Medical Emergency Radiological Response Team can decontaminate victims and provide medical care, its sole purpose is to respond to a radiological incident. The U. S. Marine Corps Chemical- Biological Incident Response Force and the Department of Health and Human Services' National Medical Response Teams are intended to respond and treat victims in a chemical or biological incident. The U. S. Marine Corps' team, however, can also search for and extract victims from a contaminated area. In contrast, the primary function of the National Medical Response Teams is to decontaminate and treat victims after they have been extracted. Each of the four National Medical Response Teams has a supply of antidotes to treat up to 5, 000 people who have been exposed to chemical agents. The U. S. Marine Corps' team also has a supply of antidotes, but the supply is smaller than a National Medical Response Team's supply. Moreover, the U. S. Marine Corps' supply is intended to treat team members and a limited number of victims. The Department of Health and Human Services also has numerous Disaster Medical Assistance Teams that can provide general medical treatment in various emergencies to augment the specialized care provided by other medical teams. Technical Advice Functions Several teams offer specialized technical advice to federal, state, and local responders. These teams do not significantly duplicate one another because they have different areas of expertise. In some cases, the type of incident determines which teams are appropriate to provide technical advice. For example, four to six technical advisors from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention accompany the Department of Health and Human Services' National Pharmaceutical Stockpile when it is deployed in response to a biological incident. The stockpile contains antibiotics and other medical supplies. The advisors assist state and local officials in organizing the bulk stockpile medications into individual doses and implementing plans to distribute and dispense the medications. The U. S. Army Chemical/ Biological Rapid Response Team offers technical assistance and advice to DOD's Joint Task Force for Civil Support during a terrorist incident. The team offers links to Army experts in a variety of technical disciplines, such as detection, neutralization, containment, dismantlement, and disposal of chemical and biological agents or weapons. The Department of Energy's Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/ Training Site provides expert advice concerning the medical care of victims that have been exposed to radiation. The team has expertise in, among other things, triage, decontamination procedures, and radiation dose estimates. Two DOD teams- the U. S. Army Special Augmentation Response Team- Nuclear/ Biological/ Chemical and the U. S. Army Radiological Advisory Medical Team- can provide similar types of technical advice as the Department of Energy's team. However, each team has fewer than 10 members. Furthermore, the DOD teams may not be available if they are deployed to a military crisis. Coordinating Functions Many federal teams coordinate activities at an incident site. However, the scope of their coordination responsibilities varies widely, from the response activities of federal teams overall to activities performed by a single agency. FEMA's Emergency Response Team coordinates overall federal response and recovery activities with a state government in the event of a disaster or an emergency declared by the President. DOD's Joint Task Force for Civil Support deploys to an incident and commands and coordinates the activities of federal military forces. It would not be responsible for coordinating the activities of federal civilian teams. The Department of Health and Human Services' Management Support Teams coordinate federal civilian medical teams. The Environmental Protection Agency's On- Scene Coordinators focus their work on coordinating the containment, removal, and disposal of hazardous substances. They may direct the efforts of regionally based contractors to evaluate the size and nature of the released substance and its potential hazard and to decontaminate and clean up the incident site. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Regional Incident Response Teams may be activated when an incident occurs at licensed facilities such as nuclear power plants. The teams are responsible for coordinating the technical response activities of federal entities, including hands- on response teams from the Department of Energy. The Department of Energy- led Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center acts as the control point for all federal assets involved in monitoring and assessing levels of radioactivity outside the immediate incident site. 6 Appendixes III, IV, and V provide more details on the federal teams' primary functions in response to a chemical, biological, and radiological/ nuclear incident. 6 The Department of Energy has the lead responsibility for coordinating the early phases of the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center. During later stages, the Environmental Protection Agency assumes control and other federal agencies participate. Team Budgets Are Not Federal agencies lack a coherent framework to develop and evaluate Guided by a National budget requirements for their response teams. We have noted previously that the federal government lacks a national strategy to guide resource Strategy investments for combating terrorism. 7 We have stated that there needs to be a federal or national strategy on combating terrorism that has a clear desired outcome. Such an outcome would provide a goal and allow measurement of progress toward that goal. In December 1998, the Department of Justice issued the Attorney General's Five- Year Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan. The plan was intended to serve as a baseline strategy for coordination of a national strategy and operational capabilities to combat terrorism. As part of its ongoing efforts, the Department of Justice updated the plan in March 2000. According to a Department of Justice official, both the original plan and its update were developed through an interagency process that included, among others, participants from the Department of Defense and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The 5- year plan, which is classified, lists specific combating terrorism tasks agencies are to perform. In our view, the Attorney General's 5- year plan is the current document that most resembles a national strategy. It represents an interagency effort that identifies which federal agencies will perform specific tasks. However, the plan is not useful for guiding resource investments in response teams because it does not link recommended actions to budget resources. The original plan indicated that updated versions would link recommended actions to budget resources. The March 2000 update, however, does not identify this linkage. A Department of Justice official who is responsible for the plan stated that the Attorney General does not believe that the Department of Justice should direct the budget resources of other agencies. Furthermore, the updated plan identifies needed actions without citing clear desired outcomes that the federal government is trying to achieve. As stated earlier, most federal consequence management teams are longstanding and fulfill roles other than combating terrorism. While agencies may be able to identify how much they invest in their teams, they cannot easily estimate what proportion of that investment is for combating 7 Combating Terrorism: Issues in Managing Counterterrorist Programs (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 00- 145, Apr. 6, 2000) and Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 00- 218, July 29, 2000). terrorism functions. For example, the Department of Energy tracks the operating, technical integration, and exercise costs for the Aerial Measuring System and other response teams. The Department, however, does not track combating terrorism costs separately. Other missions of the Aerial Measuring System aircraft are to respond to an accidental, as well as intentional, release of radioactive materials, and to conduct work for other agencies by providing baseline surveys of radiation levels. In 1999, the National Security Council and OMB began a new interagency process for evaluating combating terrorism programs governmentwide to help identify duplication and shortfalls as well as prioritize programs. As part of this process, federal agencies were asked to identify new combating terrorism funding specifically for weapons of mass destruction preparedness activities, including their response teams. Interagency working groups reviewed the agencies' proposals and developed recommendations on whether they should be funded. The agencies were expected to integrate the working groups' funding recommendations into their fiscal year 2001 President's Budget submissions. Prior to this jointly sponsored process, agencies would make combating terrorism budget recommendations through the annual OMB budget submission. Decisions were made on an agency- by- agency basis rather than in a governmentwide context. According to OMB officials, Presidential Decision Directives 62 and 63 and the Attorney General's 5- year plan serve as criteria for the program evaluations in the new interagency process. 8 On the basis of our discussion with OMB officials, it is unclear to us whether and to what extent the Presidential Decision Directives and the 5- year plan were used in the process. In the absence of a national strategy, it was also unclear to us how the National Security Council, OMB, and the agencies were developing and evaluating combating terrorism budget requirements for agency response teams. While the interagency process gives decisionmakers a better picture of the resources federal agencies are devoting to their response capabilities, it does not serve as an effective mechanism for allocating funding to the highest priority areas because these areas have not been clearly defined. 8 In May 1998, the President issued Presidential Decision Directive 63 to address protection of the Nation's critical infrastructure. We found an instance where the new interagency process was circumvented. FEMA's fiscal year 2001 budget submission to OMB requested $3.8 million to upgrade the capabilities of 6 of its 28 Urban Search and Rescue Task Force teams so that they can operate in a contaminated environment. OMB reviewed FEMA's budget and, as a result, did not include the Urban Search and Rescue request. Nevertheless, FEMA requested that the National Security Council include this proposal as part of the fiscal year 2001 President's Budget request. 9 Furthermore, according to a FEMA official, this budget proposal was not based on a national strategy, but rather was precipitated by congressional perception that the search and rescue teams already had this capability. A national strategy could provide the framework and criteria for determining whether such an enhanced capability- and others that federal agencies might propose- represent progress toward meeting desired outcomes. Interagency Activities Federal agencies participate in exercises and other interagency activities to Offer Opportunities for coordinate how their individual response teams will operate together in a terrorist scenario. Two recent interagency activities have identified Better Coordination opportunities for improving the operational coordination of federal response teams. First, FEMA is leading an interagency steering group that is identifying groups of federal teams that could respond to different terrorist scenarios. Such planning can be useful; however, the steering group has not consulted with scientific experts and the intelligence community to assess the realism of its scenarios. Second, federal, state, and local agencies participated in a major field exercise in May 2000 that involved mock terrorist events in three U. S. metropolitan areas. The lessons learned from this exercise- the first of its kind- could improve operational coordination of response teams from all levels of government. However, no additional exercises of this nature are currently planned. 9 This funding for the Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces was part of FEMA's fiscal year 2001 President Budget's submission. Interagency Group Plans In 1998, FEMA formed the Weapons of Mass Destruction Interagency Team Responses, but Steering Group to identify which consequence management teams could respond to specific terrorist scenarios. 10 The steering group is identifying Realism of Scenarios Has the functions of individual federal response teams and developing a Not Been Assessed database to include the size and composition of each team, its equipment, response time, and other data. The response teams that can respond together to a given scenario are referred to as a force package. As a basis for developing the force packages, the interagency steering group has created various terrorist scenarios, which include (1) release of a chemical agent, (2) release of a biological agent, (3) release of radiological material, and (4) detonation of a nuclear device. According to a FEMA official, if an incident occurs, a force package can be pared and tailored based on the specific requirements. The steering group has long- term plans to improve the database, develop further scenarios, refine its force packages, and incorporate observations from terrorism exercises. One long- term plan, for example, is to create smaller force packages of teams that would respond during the first 24 hours of different types of incidents. Prior to the group's efforts, federal agencies did not engage in this type of interagency planning for a terrorist incident. 10 The federal agencies listed in figure 2 are members of the interagency steering group. The FEMA- led interagency steering group's efforts have been based upon worst- case scenarios rather than analysis of credible threats. Specifically, when developing the scenarios for the force packages, the group did not consult with scientific experts from the disciplines of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear warfare to assess the scenarios' realism. For example, the group's biological scenario involved the dissemination of plague. According to various biological warfare and scientific experts we consulted for our prior work, 11 it is difficult to obtain, produce, and disseminate plague, especially in sufficient quantities to produce mass casualties. The steering group also did not incorporate information about the threat of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear terrorism from the intelligence community. According to a Federal Emergency Management Agency official who is leading the steering group's efforts, the scenarios were intended to be worst- case events that would stress the federal response system, and therefore assessing the realism of the scenarios was not a concern. Because the realism of the scenarios was not assessed, it is uncertain whether they can provide a sound analytical basis for developing appropriate federal consequence management responses. We believe that consultation with experts in the scientific and intelligence communities is important for realistic consequence management planning. Moreover, we have previously reported that valid, current, and documented threat information is crucial to ensuring that countermeasures or programs are not based solely on worst- case scenarios and are therefore out of balance with the threat. 12 Exercise Shows Progress in Presidential Decision Directive 39 requires key federal agencies to maintain Response Team well- exercised combating terrorism capabilities. Exercises test and Coordination validate policies and procedures, test the effectiveness of response capabilities, increase the confidence and skill levels of personnel, and identify strengths and weaknesses in response before they arise in actual incidents. Furthermore, federal efforts to combat terrorism are inherently interagency matters, and exercises allow agency personnel to become familiar with each other's missions and procedures and learn to coordinate and operate together. 11 Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 163, Sept. 7, 1999). 12 Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public Health Initiatives (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 99- 112, Mar. 16, 1999). In 1999, a congressional mandate required that a national combating terrorism field exercise be conducted “without notice” and include “the participation of all key personnel.” 13 The Department of Justice and FEMA sponsored such an exercise, TOPOFF 2000, in May 2000. The exercise included concurrent responses to a radiological terrorist incident in the Washington, D. C., area; a biological terrorist incident in the Denver, Colorado, area; and a chemical terrorist incident in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. 14 Eighteen federal agencies participated in addition to state and local government agencies. 15 The overall stated goals of the exercise were to test federal, state, and local response to a challenging series of no- notice, integrated, geographically dispersed terrorist acts; assess the Nation's crisis and consequence management capacity under stressful conditions; and develop lessons learned to enhance domestic preparedness. TOPOFF 2000 represented progress over previous combating terrorism exercises. We reported in 1999 that federal agencies had conducted 201 combating terrorism exercises in the previous 3 years. We noted several shortcomings in these exercises that limited their effectiveness in preparing federal, state, and local agencies for response to a terrorist incident. 16 For example, FEMA had not conducted consequence management field exercises. Of the 201 exercises, only 4 were considered no- notice exercises in which participants were not given advance notification. None of the four exercises included consequence management activities. TOPOFF 2000, which included participation by many of the response teams discussed in this report, addressed many earlier shortcomings. 13 This requirement is in House Report 105- 825 (Oct. 19, 1998), Making Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1999. 14 The related concurrent exercise in the Washington, D. C., area, was referred to as National Capital Region 2000. For purposes of the report, we refer to all three venues as TOPOFF 2000. 15 Private voluntary organizations such as the American Red Cross and the Salvation Army also participated in TOPOFF 2000. 16 Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorism Operations (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 135, May 13, 1999) and Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Federal Counterterrorist Exercises (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 157BR, June 25, 1999). TOPOFF 2000 included scenarios where crisis and consequence management activities occurred simultaneously. In a terrorist incident, crisis and consequence management activities would overlap, so it is important that federal teams exercise these activities together. TOPOFF 2000 included transfers of authority among government agencies. For example, a local fire chief transferred authority over the incident site to Federal Bureau of Investigation officials to enable processing of the crime scene. Such transfers are important to practice because the response to a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear terrorist incident would likely require a response from multiple agencies at the federal, state, and local levels. TOPOFF 2000 was conducted as a field exercise rather than a tabletop exercise. Field exercises are more challenging because agency command and response teams actually deploy to practice their skills and coordination in a realistic field setting. Tabletop exercises, on the other hand, do not include the deployment of actual response teams and their equipment. TOPOFF 2000 was designed and executed as a no- notice exercise. 17 Nonotice exercises provide the highest degree of realism to federal response teams and can lead to improvements in deployment procedures to an incident site so that state and local first responders receive federal assistance as soon as possible. Final after- action reports for TOPOFF 2000 have not yet been completed. After- action reports typically identify both successful interagency actions and procedures and areas that need improvements and highlight shortcomings in the overall structure and management of the exercise. Based on our observations of TOPOFF 2000, we believe that it largely met the overall goals. We believe that large, periodic exercises like TOPOFF 2000 provide valuable insight to the complex relationships necessary for a coordinated response to a domestic terrorist incident. For example, a simulated National Pharmaceutical Stockpile was delivered and distributed for the first time in TOPOFF 2000 to treat victims exposed to aerosolized plague. The delivery of the stockpile during an exercise provided an opportunity for federal, state, and local governments to coordinate their respective responses. Figure 4 shows the simulated National 17 We consider TOPOFF 2000 to be a no- notice exercise because it was planned by a group of “trusted agents” who were not to disclose details of the exercise scenarios and timing to response teams and other participants. We recognize that response teams and participants were probably aware of the general timing of the exercise, and some may have inadvertently learned about some exercise details. Pharmaceutical Stockpile after it has been delivered and unloaded at the Buckley Air National Guard Base, Denver, Colorado. The items in the simulated stockpile were subsequently distributed to hospitals and other points of distribution, such as makeshift medical treatment centers, so that victims could be appropriately treated. Figure 4: Arrival of a Simulated National Pharmaceutical Stockpile During the TOPOFF 2000 Exercise Source: GAO.